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TAXATION-FEDERAL lNcoME TAX-CONSEQUENCES TO SELLER AND BUYER 
OF COVENANT NoT TO COMPETE-The owners of the entire capital stock of a 
newspaper business received an offer of $1,000,000 for their stock and a 
covenant not to compete with buyers for ten years. After the offer was accepted 
and the contract of sale drawn up, buyer asked for a clause in the contract 
evaluating the covenant not to compete at $50 a share and the stock at $150 a 
share in order to help him taxwise. The clause was accepted with little dis-
cussion. The sellers reported the entire proceeds of the sale on their income 
tax returns as long term capital gain, but the Commissioner ruled that $50 per 
share of the proceeds constituted consideration for the covenant not to compete 
and was taxable as ordinary income. The Tax Court held that since the 
covenant was treated as a separate item in the negotiations, the amount received 
for it was ordinary income. Clarence Clark Hamlin Trust, 19 T.C. 718 (1953). 
The buyer treated $50 per share of the amount paid as a capital expenditure 
for the covenant and deducted an amount representing amortization of the cost. 
In this case the Commissioner argued that the agreement not to compete was 
no more than an incident to the transfer of the good will of the business and 
had no separable value. The Tax Court held that the covenant had a 
separable value and was a depreciable capital asset. Gazette Telegraph Co., 
19 T.C. 692 (1953). 
When a contract for the sale of a business is accompanied by a covenant 
by the sellers not to compete1 with the buyers for a specified period, questions 
arise as to the tax consequences of the transaction to both parties.2 Where the 
covenant is made by a person other than the seller, e.g., a key employee or 
shareholder in a small corporation, the consideration he receives is ordinary 
income.8 In these cases, the payment received by the covenantor is not an 
incident to a contract for sale of the covenantor's property, but compensation 
1 For a discussion of the legality of covenants not to compete from the restraint of 
trade point of view see Carpenter, "Validity of Contracts Not to Compete," 76 UNIV. PA. 
L. REv. 244 (1928). 
2 See Kamens and Ancier, ''Tax Consequences of a Covenant Not to Compete," 27 
TAXES 891 (1949). 
s Cox v. Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 987; Salvage v. Commissioner, 
(2d Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 112, affd. Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U.S. 106, 56 S.Ct. 375 
(1936); Beals' Estate v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 268. 
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for refraining from work which is as much income to him as is money paid to 
a person for the performance of services.4 Research discloses no decided cases 
dealing with the treatment that should be accorded the consideration paid in 
the covenantee's return, but it would seem that it should be regarded as a 
deferred expense to be amortized over the life of the covenant if the expense 
meets the ordinary and necessary requirement. The questions are more difficult 
where the seller is the covenantor. The generally recognized rule is that where 
good will is sold in connection with the sale of a business, the seller is precluded 
from soliciting the former customers of the business sold, even though no 
covenant not to compete is included in the contract for sale of the business.5 
In many cases it is probable that forbearance from competition by the seller is 
the substance of the good will transferred, and the inclusion of a covenant not 
to compete in the contract is a superfluity or at most a mere incident to the 
transfer of good will. In such cases no attempt is made to split the consideration 
received by the seller into capital gain and ordinary income; the entire trans-
action is regarded as a capital transfer.6 If, on the other hand, the covenant 
not to compete is bargained for by the buyer as a separate item in connection 
with the contract of sale, then the amount received for it is ordinary income to 
the seller. 7 A similar distinction must be made to determine the proper treat-
ment by the buyer. Where the court concludes that the covenant is inseparable 
from the transfer of good will, the buyer may not amortize any of the con-
sideration paid over the life of the covenant, since good will is not a depreciable 
asset.8 If the covenant is separable, the buyer may amortize its cost. In 
4 "In this country, every man has the right to exercise any lawful avocation on the 
same terms with his neighbor •••• If he sells his .services for wages or salary, what he 
receives is income. If he refrains from exercising his skill and ability in a particular line 
for a definite period, what he receives in compensation is just as much a gain and is 
income." Cox v. Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 987 at 988. 
5 This rule was laid down in England in Trego v. Hunt, [1896] A. C. 7, and is gen-
erally followed in the United States. See, e.g., Von Bremen v. MacMonnies, 200 N.Y. 
41, 93 N.E. 186 (1910). Connecticut apparently refuses to give any protection to the 
buyer in the absence of an express covenant. Cottrell v. Babcock Printing Press Mfg. Co., 
54 Conn. 122, 6 A. 791 (1886). In Massachusetts, "it is a question of fact whether having 
regard to the character of the business sold and that set up, the new business does or does 
not derogate from the grant made by that sale." Old Comer Book Store v. Upham, 194 
Mass. 101 at 105, 80 N.E. 228 (1907). 
6 In Toledo Newspaper Co., 2 T.C. 794 (1943), this result was reached even though 
the contract stated a separate consideration for the covenant not to compete. A similar 
result was reached in Aaron Michaels, 12 T.C. 17 (1949), where the sole proprietor of a 
laundry sold his business and agreed not to compete for £ve years. 
7Jn Rodney B. Horton, 13 T.C. 143 (1949), taxpayer sold his accounting business 
listing good will as a speci£c item and including in the contract a covenant not to compete 
for six years. There was no allocation of the consideration in the contract. The court held 
that part of the consideration was allocable to the sale of good will and part to ordinary 
income as payment for the covenant not to compete. 
8 "No deduction for depreciation, including obsolescence, is allowable in respect of good 
will." Treas. Reg. 118, §39.230)-3. The regulation is based on the decision in Clarke v. 
Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384, 50 S.Ct. 155 (1929). When the 
buyer of the newspaper involved in Toledo Newspaper Co., note 6 supra, tried to amortize 
the cost allocated in the covenant, the Tax Court was consistent with its former holding 
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Christensen Machine Co. v. United States,9 a corporation bought out the stock 
of an inventor who was one of the two principal stockholders and secured a 
covenant from him not to compete for five years. No allocation of the $60,000 
consideration was made by the parties. The corporation in its tax return 
allocated $30,000 to the covenant and deducted one-fifth of this amount during 
the first year. This treatment of the transaction was approved by the court 
since the $30,000 was viewed as purchase of a "valuable asset."10 In the 
principal case, the form which the sale of the business took may be important, 
• since in theory, at least, it would seem that corporate good will is attached to 
the corporation itself and not the individual ownership interests. Therefore, 
when the owners sell their stock there is no transfer of good will to which the 
covenant not to compete can be said to be a mere incident. This is somewhat 
unrealistic, of course, and the factor which the court stresses is that the parties 
themselves allocated a portion of the consideration to the covenant which showed 
they had dealt with it as a separate item from good will.11 Although the 
principles of law governing cases of this type are reasonably clear, the cases 
illustrate the difficulties of trying to determine whether or not the covenant 
was treated as a separate item by the parties in their negotiations. Since the 
court in the principal case gives much weight to the recitals in the contract 
as to the allocation of the consideration, the decision indicates the importance 
to both buyer and seller of being aware of the possible tax consequences of 
such recitals. If both are familiar with the problem, it is more likely that the 
bargaining process will set a price on the covenant which reflects its true value 
to both parties, and will serve as a fair basis for tax treatment. 
Richard B. Barnett, S.Ed. 
and refused the deduction. Toledo Blade Co.,11 T.C. 1079 (1948), affd. (6th Cir. 1950) 
180 F. (2d) 357. In R. Bryson Jones, 17 B.T.A. 1213 (1929), a similar result was reached 
in a case involvmg the sale of an insurance business coupled with a covenant not to compete 
for 10 years. The court felt that the good will was the principal asset transferred in the 
sale. 
o (Ct. Cl. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 282. 
10 Similar decisions are Black River Sand Corp., 18 B.T.A. 490 (1929), and B. T. 
Babbitt, Inc., 32 B.T.A. 693 (1935). 
11 "After taking into account all of the relevant facts of the transaction and considering 
the whole record, we have concluded that the written contract accurately reHected the 
agreement of the parties and that the agreement was reached at arm's length. In the circum-
stances it is not incumbent on the Court to disturb the allocation of purchase price made 
by the parties themselves." 19 T.C. 718 at 724. The dissent points out that the evaluation 
clause was inserted at the last moment with little discussion "to help the buyers taxwise," 
and that the sellers were unaware of the consequences to themselves of what they were 
doing. 
